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Abstract
There has been a great of work on characterizing the complexity of the satisfiability and
validity problem for modal logics. In particular, Ladner showed that the validity problem
for all logics between K, T, and S4 is PSPACE-complete, while for S5 it is NP-complete.
We show that, in a precise sense, it is negative introspection, the axiom ¬Kp ⇒ K¬Kp,
that causes the gap. In a precise sense, if we require this axiom, then the satisfiability
problem is NP-complete; without it, it is PSPACE-complete.
1 Introduction
There has been a great of work on characterizing the complexity of the satisfiability and validity
problem for modal logics (see [Halpern and Moses 1992; Ladner 1977; Vardi 1989] for some
examples of most interest here). In particular, Ladner [1977] showed that the validity problem
for all logics between K, T, and S4 is PSPACE-complete, while for S5 it is NP-complete.
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An easy modification of his argument shows that it is NP-complete for KD45 as well. There
has been followup work trying to understand what causes the gap between NP and PSPACE.
Expressed in terms of epistemic reasoning, Vardi [1989] showed that, in a precise sense, the
ability to combine distinct items of knowledge, as characterized by the axiom Kp ∧ Kq ⇒
K(p ∧ q), causes the gap; requiring this axiom gives PSPACE-completeness, while without
it we get NP-completeness. We give another characterization. We show that, in a precise
sense, it is negative introspection, the axiom ¬Kp⇒ K¬Kp, that causes the gap. In a precise
sense, if we require this axiom, then the satisfiability problem is NP-complete; without it, it is
PSPACE-complete.
More precisely, consider the following axioms and inference rules, all of which have been
well-studied in the literature [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995]:
A1. All tautologies of propositional calculus
A2. (Kϕ ∧K(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Kψ (Distribution Axiom)
A3. Kϕ⇒ ϕ (Knowledge Axiom)
A4. Kϕ⇒ KKϕ (Positive Introspection Axiom)
A5. ¬Kϕ⇒ K¬Kϕ, (Negative Introspection Axiom)
A6. ¬K(false) (Consistency Axiom)
R1. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ (modus ponens)
R2. From ϕ infer Kϕ, (Knowledge Generalization)
The system K consists of A1, A2, R1, and R2; the system T is K + A3; the system A4 is T +
A4; the system S5 is S4 + A5; the system KD45 is S5 + A6 − A3.
Consider any modal logic that includes A1, A2, R1, R2 and some (possibly empty) subset
of A3, A4, and A5. We show that the satisfiability for the resulting logic is NP-complete
iff A5 is included; otherwise it is PSPACE-complete. While this result follows easily from
well-known techniques, it does not seem to have been observed before.
2 Modal Logic: A Brief Review
We briefly review basic modal logic, introducing the notation used in the statement and proof
of our result. The syntax of the modal logic is as follows: formulas are formed by starting
with a set Φ = {p, q, . . .} of primitive propositions, and then closing off under conjunction
(∧), negation (¬), and the modal operator K. Call the resulting language LK
1
(Φ). As usual,
we define ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ⇒ ψ as abbreviations of ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, respectively. The
intended interpretation ofKϕ varies depending on the context. It typically has been interpreted
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as knowledge, as belief, and as necessity. Under the epistemic interpretation, Kϕ is read as
“the agent knows ϕ”; under the necessity interpretation,Kϕ can be read “ϕ is necessarily true”.
The standard approach to giving semantics to formulas in LK
1
(Φ) is by means of Kripke
structures. A tuple M = (S, pi,K) is a Kripke structure (over Φ) if S is a set of states, pi :
S × Φ → {true, false} is an interpretation that determines which primitive propositions are
true at each state, K is a binary relation on S. Intuitively, (s, t) ∈ K if, in state s, state t is
considered possible (by the agent, if we are thinking ofK as representing an agent’s knowledge
or belief). For convenience, we define K(s) = {t : (s, t) ∈ K}.
Let M(Φ) denote the class of all Kripke structures over Φ with no restrictions on the K
relation. Depending on the desired interpretation of the formula Kϕ, a number of conditions
may be imposed on the binary relation K. K is reflexive if for all s ∈ S, (s, s) ∈ K; it is
transitive if for all s, t, u ∈ S, if (s, t) ∈ K and (t, u) ∈ K, then (s, u) ∈ K; it is serial if
for all s ∈ S there exists t ∈ S such that (s, t) ∈ K; it is Euclidean if for all s, t, u ∈ S, if
(s, t) ∈ K and (s, u) ∈ K then (t, u) ∈ K. We use the superscripts r, e, t and s to indicate
that the K relation is restricted to being reflexive, Euclidean, transitive, and serial, respectively.
Thus, for example,Mrt(Φ) is the class of all Kripke strutures where the K relation is reflexive
and transitive.
We write (M, s) |= ϕ if ϕ is true at state s in the Kripke structure M . The truth relation is
defined inductively as follows:
(M, s) |= p, for p ∈ Φ, if pi(s, p) = true
(M, s) |= ¬ϕ if (M, s) 6|= ϕ
(M, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ
(M, s) |= Kϕ if (M, t) |= ϕ for all t such that (s, t) ∈ K
A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in Kripke structure M if there exists s ∈ S such that
(M, s) |= ϕ; ϕ valid in M if (M, s) |= ϕ for all s ∈ S. A formula is satisfiable (resp., valid)
in a class N of Kripke structures if it is satisfiable in some Kripke structure in N (resp., valid
in all Kripke structures in N ).
There is a well-known correspondence between properties of theK relation and axioms: re-
flexivity corresponds to A3, transitivity corresponds to A4, the Euclidean property corresponds
to A5, and the serial property corresponds to A6. This correspondence is made precise in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.1: [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] Let C be a (possibly empty) subset
of {A3, A4, A5, A6} and let C be the corresponding subset of {r, t, e, s}. Then {A1, A2,
R1, R2} ∪ C is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language LK
1
(Φ) with respect to
MC(Φ).
3 The Result
We can now state our main result.
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Theorem 3.1: For C ⊆ {r, e, t, s}, the complexity of the problem of deciding if a formula
ϕ ∈ LK
1
(Φ) is satisfiable in MC(Φ) is NP-complete if e ∈ C, and is PSPACE-complete if
e /∈ C.
The theorem claimed in the introduction, namely, that the satisfiability problem for the log-
ics discussed in the introduction is NP-complete iff A5 is an axiom, and otherwise is PSPACE-
complete, follows immediately from Theorems 2.1 and 3.1.
Proof: Much of the proof of Theorem 3.1 is known. In particular, the PSPACE hardness result
in the case that e /∈ C follows from Ladner’s results. Ladner proves the matching upper bound
if C = ∅ (the system K), C = {r} (the system T), and C = {r, t} (the system S4). Since a
reflexive relation is serial, Ladner’s results deal with the cases C = {r, s} and C = {r, t, s}
as well. It is straightforward to modify Ladner’s argument to get PSPACE-completness in the
remaining cases where e /∈ C. For the cases where e ∈ C, it is well known (and easy to
show) that if a relation is reflexive and Euclidean, then it is symmetric, transitive, and serial,
so Mr,e = Mr,e,t = Mr,e,s = Mr,e,s,t. Since Ladner proves NP-completeness for S5, when
the K relation is an equivalence relation, NP-completeness in all these cases follows. NP-
completeness in the case where C = {r, t} is proved in [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi
1995], using a slight modification of Ladner’s techniques. We generalize these arguments to
deal with the case that C = {e}. All the remaining cases actually follow from our argument.
As usual, let |ϕ| denote the length of ϕ when viewed a string of symbols. As in the proof
of Proposition 3.6.2 in [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995], the key step in showing NP-
completness lies in showing that a formula is satisfiable in Me iff it is satisfiable in a structure
with few states of a particular type. This characterization (and its proof) is a generalization of
analogous characterizations given in Propositions 3.1.6 and 3.6.2 in [Fagin, Halpern, Moses,
and Vardi 1995] for satisfiability in Mr,e,t and Me,s,t.
Lemma 3.2: A formula ϕ is satisfiable in Me iff there exists some structure M such that
(M, s0) |= ϕ, where M = ({s0} ∪ S ∪ S ′, pi,K), and (a) S and S ′ are disjoint sets of states;
(b) if S = ∅ then S ′ = ∅, (c) K(s0) = S; (d) K(s) = S ∪ S ′ if s ∈ S ∪ S ′; and (e)
|{s0} ∪ S ∪ S ′| ≤ |ϕ|.
Note that we may have s0 /∈ S∪S ′. However, if s0 ∈ S∪S ′, then it follows from conditions
(a), (c), and (d) that S ′ = ∅. We get a characterization for
• Mes by requiring that S 6= ∅;
• Met by requiring that S ′ = ∅;
• Mest by requiring that S ′ = ∅ and S 6= ∅;
• Mre =Mret =Mrest by requiring that s0 ∈ S (so that, as we have observed, S ′ = ∅).
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The third and fourth characterizations are Proposition 3.1.6 in [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and
Vardi 1995].
Proof: Suppose that M is a structure of the type described in the statement of the lemma,
(s, t) ∈ K, and (s, t′) ∈ K. Then t′ ∈ K(t) = S ∪ S ′, so K is Euclidean. It follows that
M ∈ Me. Thus, if (M, s0) |= ϕ, then ϕ is satisfiable in Me.
For the converse, we proceed much as in the proof of Propositions 3.1.6 and 3.6.2 in [Fa-
gin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995]. Suppose that M ′ = (T, pi′,K′) ∈ Me, s0 ∈ T , and
(M ′, s0) |= ϕ. Let F1 be the set of subformulas of ϕ of the form Kψ such that (M ′, s0) |=
¬Kψ, and let F2 be the set of subformulas of ϕ of the formKψ such thatKKψ is a subformula
of ϕ and (M ′, s0) |= ¬KKψ ∧Kψ. (We remark that it is not hard to show that if M ∈ MC
where e and at least one of r or t is in C, then F2 = ∅.)
For each formulaKψ ∈ F1, there must exist a state sF1ψ ∈ K′(s0) such that (M ′, s
F1
ψ ) |= ¬ψ.
Note that if F1 6= ∅ then K′(s0) 6= ∅. Define I(s0) = {s0} if s0 ∈ K′(s0), and I(s0) = ∅
otherwise. Let S = {sF1ψ : Kψ ∈ F1} ∪ I(s0). If Kψ ∈ F2 then KKψ ∈ F1, so there must
exist a state sF2ψ ∈ K′(s
F1
Kψ) such that (M ′, s
F2
ψ ) |= ¬ψ. Moreover, since (M ′, s0) |= Kψ, it
must be the case that sF2ψ /∈ K′(s0). Let S ′′ = {sF2ψ : Kψ ∈ F2}. By construction, S ′ and S ′′
are disjoint. Moreover, if S = ∅, then F1 = ∅, so F2 = ∅ and S ′ = ∅.
Let S∗ = {s0} ∪ S ∪ S ′. Define the binary relation K on S∗ by taking K(s0) = S and
K(t) = S ∪ S ′ for t ∈ S ∪ S ′. To show that this is well defined, we must show that (a) s0 /∈ S ′
and that (b) if s0 ∈ S, then S ′ = ∅. For (a), suppose by way of contradiction that s0 ∈ S ′. Thus,
there exists s ∈ S such that s0 ∈ K′(s). By the Euclidean property, it follows that s0 ∈ K′(s0),
a contradiction since S ′ is disjoint from K′(s0). For (b), note that if s0 ∈ S, then s0 ∈ K′(s0).
It is easy to see that if s, s′ ∈ K′(s0), then K′(s) = K′(s′). For if s, s′ ∈ K′(s0) then, by
the Euclidean property, s′ ∈ K′(s). Thus, if t ∈ K′(s), another application of the Euclidean
property shows that t ∈ K′(s′). Hence, K′(s′) ⊆ K′(s). A symmetric argument gives equality.
But now suppose that t ∈ S ′. Then, as we have observed, there exists some s ∈ S such that
t ∈ K′(s)−K′(s0). But if s0 ∈ S, then K′(s)−K′(s0) = ∅. Thus, S ′ = ∅ if s0 ∈ S.
A similar argument shows that K is the restriction of K′ to S∗. For clearly S ′ is disjoint
from K′(s0), so K(s0) = K′(s0)∩S∗. Now suppose that s ∈ S ∪ S ′. It is easy to see that there
exists some s′ ∈ S such that s ∈ K′(s′). This is clear by construction if s ∈ S ′. And if s ∈ S,
then s ∈ K′(s0) and, by the Euclidean property, s ∈ K′(s). If t ∈ S ∪S ′, we want to show that
t ∈ K′(s). Again, there exists some t′ such that t′ ∈ S and t ∈ K′(t′). Since s′, t′ ∈ K′(s0),
by the Euclidean property, s′ ∈ K′(t′). Since s′, t ∈ K′(t′), the Euclidean property implies
that t ∈ K′(s′). Since s, t ∈ K′(s′), yet another application of the Euclidean property shows
that t ∈ K′(s). Thus, K(s) ⊆ K′(s) ∩ S∗. To prove equality suppose that t ∈ K′(s) ∩ S∗. If
t ∈ S ∪ S ′, then by definition t ∈ K(s). If t = s0, then by the Euclidean property it follows
that s0 ∈ K′(s0), so s0 ∈ S ⊆ K(s). Thus, t ∈ K(s), as desired.
LetM = (S∗, pi,K), where pi is the restriction of pi′ to {s0}∪S∪S ′. It is well known [Fagin,
Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] that there are at most |ϕ| subformulas of ϕ. Since F1 and F2
are disjoint sets of subformulas of ϕ, form Kψ, and at least one subformula of ϕ is a primitive
proposition (and thus not of the formKψ), it must be the case that |F1|+ |F2| ≤ |ϕ|−1, giving
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us the desired bound on the number of states.
We now show that for all states s ∈ S∗ and for all subformulas ψ of ϕ (including ϕ itself),
(M, s) |= ψ iff (M ′, s) |= ψ. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ϕ. The only
nontrivial case is when ψ is of the form Kψ′. If (M ′, s) |= Kψ′, then (M ′, t) |= ψ′ for all
t ∈ K′(t). Since K is the restriction of K′ to S∗, this implies that (M ′, t) |= ψ′ for all t ∈ K(s).
Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (M, t) |= ψ′ for all t ∈ K(s); that is, (M, s) |= Kψ′. For
the converse, suppose that (M ′, s) |= ¬Kψ′. If it is also the case that (M ′, s0) |= ¬Kψ′,
then Kψ′ ∈ F1. By the induction hypothesis, (M, sF1ψ′ ) |= ¬ψ′. Thus, (M, s) |= ¬Kψ′. If
(M ′, s0) |= Kψ
′
, then standard arguments using the fact that K′ is Euclidean can be used to
show (M ′, s0) |= ¬KKψ′. Thus, Kψ′ ∈ F2, and (M, sF2ψ′ ) |= ¬ψ′ by the induction hypothesis.
Again, it follows that (M, s) |= ¬Kψ′.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 in the case that C = {e} now follows easily. To check that
ϕ is satisfiable in Me, we simply guess a structure of the form described in Lemma 3.2 and
verify that it does indeed satisfy ϕ. (Verifying that the structure guessed does indeed satisfy ϕ
is an instance of the model-checking problem, which is well known to be in polynomial time
[Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995]). Thus, the problem is in NP. The argument for the
other cases with e ∈ C follows by a straightforward modification of Lemma 3.2, as outlined
just before the proof of the lemma.
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